Oppression of Shareholders in a Private Company
Avinadav Preuss, Advocate · Published: 8 November 2026
Section 191 of the Companies Law, 5759-1999, provides: "Where a matter of the company has been conducted in a manner that involves oppression of its shareholders, all or some of them, or where there is a substantial concern that it will be so conducted, the court may, upon the application of a shareholder, give such directions as it sees fit to remove or prevent the oppression."
- What is the "oppression" referred to in this section, and how does it appear in practice?
- What directions may a court give under this section?
- And how do those directions remove or prevent the oppression?
This article addresses these questions (and others), and offers useful information to a shareholder in a company, and to anyone involved in its affairs, such as an office holder, who faces a situation that raises concern about the proper conduct of the company or about the protection of his or her rights.
Chapter 1: What is "oppression"?
Alongside section 191, section 192(b) of the Companies Law also imposes a duty on a shareholder to refrain from oppressing other shareholders.
However, the law does not define "oppression", and contains no closed list of cases that may amount to oppression. The case law has examined and interpreted the term broadly.
In principle, the courts have recognized oppression as a situation "of unfair distribution of resources within the relationship between the controlling shareholders and the minority shareholders".1 At the same time, oppression is also possible where no shareholder holds a majority, such as a company in which two shareholders each hold 50%, or a company in which several shareholders hold shares and none holds a majority.2
In a small private company that is regarded as a "quasi-partnership", the courts have recognized a legitimate expectation on the part of the shareholders to take part in managing the company.3 Denying a shareholder this right will often be treated as oppression.
It has also been held that in a quasi-partnership a claim may be brought under section 191 of the Companies Law, seeking a separation of powers between the shareholders, even where no actual oppression has been proved, but "only" where the trust between the parties, on which their joint activity was based, has disappeared.4
Chapter 2: How does oppression appear in practice?
In practice, oppression may take various forms. For example, excluding a shareholder from information, denying the right to receive and inspect documents relating to the company, and removing the shareholder from the places where decisions are made may amount to oppression, particularly in a quasi-partnership, because such acts undermine that shareholder's legitimate expectation of taking an active part in managing the company.
Another example is the clear case of an unfair distribution of resources in the company: not distributing a dividend while the majority extracts value from the company by other means; drawing a salary or entering into a transaction in a manner that benefits the majority shareholders at the expense of the minority shareholders; issuing or allotting shares in a way that unequally dilutes the minority shareholders; changing the rights (whether economic or managerial) attached to a particular class of shares in a manner that harms their holders; and other cases.
Chapter 3: What directions may the court give?
Section 191 of the Companies Law gives the court broad discretion: it may give "such directions as it sees fit to remove or prevent the oppression". The case law has stressed that the section is "an open texture, a framework provision that does not set a closed list of ways to remove oppression or to separate powers in the company".5
In practice, the court has a varied toolbox for removing or preventing oppression; among other things, the court may give one or more of the following types of directions:
Setting aside a decision and regulating future conduct. Where the company has adopted an oppressive decision, the court may set it aside. It may also lay down rules for the future: require the company to give the shareholder information about its affairs, convene board meetings regularly, or return to the company assets that were transferred out of it. In exceptional cases, management was transferred to the plaintiff for a fixed period, and the company's articles of association were amended accordingly.6 The changes the court prescribes are treated as part of the company's articles and resolutions, as if they had been properly adopted (section 191(b) of the Law).
Monetary remedies. The court may order the company to distribute a dividend to its shareholders. It may also require a person who took money from the company unlawfully to return it, or distribute its assets among the shareholders in proportion to their holdings. In certain cases, it has also been held that the majority shareholders must reimburse the company for expenses it paid out of its own pocket for their legal defense.7
Appointing a court-appointed officer. The court may appoint a manager, permanent or temporary, to run the company in place of the controlling shareholders.8 This is an extreme step, and the courts take it with caution. A milder step is to appoint an inspector, who examines the company's affairs and submits his or her findings to the court.
Directions on separation between the shareholders. Where the partnership cannot continue, the court may separate the parties in one of several ways:
Purchase or sale of shares. The court may order the oppressing controlling shareholder to buy the oppressed shareholder's shares. The price is set by reference to the company's value as it would have been but for the oppression, so that the oppressive acts do not reduce the consideration. The court may also order a shareholder to sell his or her shares where this is needed to separate the parties.9 The value for the sale may be determined by a valuer.
Bidding between the shareholders. Instead of fixing a price itself, the court may order the parties to compete against each other for the right to remain in the company. There are several ways to do this: each side submits a sealed bid to buy the other's share, and whoever offers the higher amount buys; a "BMBY" mechanism, in which one side names a price and the other chooses whether to sell its shares at that price or buy the first side's shares at that same price; and a tender in which the highest bidder wins but pays the amount of the second-highest bid.
Sale to a third party. Separation is not limited to the existing shareholders. In a company in which two shareholders hold equal shares, the court ordered that the company, or its business, be sold to whoever offers the highest price.10
A separation of powers between the shareholders is possible, as stated, even where actual oppression has not been proved, but "only" where the trust between the shareholders has dissipated.
Enforcing an arrangement fixed in advance. Where the shareholders agreed in advance on a way to separate, such as an option to buy the partner's share or a formula for calculating the price, the court may enforce that arrangement rather than shape a new one.11 This holds so long as the arrangement does not entrench the oppression: provisions of the company's articles of association do not limit the court's authority under section 191.
Winding up the company. The court may order the company wound up, that is, closed and its assets distributed. This is the most severe remedy, and it is reserved for cases in which there is no other way to remove the oppression. The court avoids it especially where the company is operating and able to pay its debts.
The court is not bound by the remedy the plaintiff sought. It may award a remedy that was not claimed, and may even decline to grant any remedy if it finds that it would serve no purpose.12 The considerations the court weighs in choosing the direction are discussed in the next chapter.
Chapter 4: The considerations a court weighs in granting relief
There is no fixed "formula" that guides the court in choosing one remedy or another. The court is required to weigh, among other things, the degree of oppression, each party's good faith and clean hands, the size of the holdings and the amount invested, each party's special connection to the company, the economic imbalance between them, their willingness to resolve the matter amicably, and the balance of benefits and harms, including those of third parties such as employees, suppliers and the company itself.13
These considerations have practical significance. A substantial economic gap between the parties, or a special connection of one of them to the business, may tip the balance toward a purchase or a sale at an appraised value. Where finality of the proceeding matters, where the company's value is hard to determine, or where the plaintiff contributed to the crisis, the court may prefer bidding.
The plaintiff's own conduct may defeat the claim: where minority shareholders were excluded from managing the company in response to their own improper conduct, it was held that their conduct negates their right to benefit from their expectations.14
Footnotes
- CA 2699/92 Bachar v. T.M.M. Food Industries (Ben Gurion Airport) Ltd., IsrSC 50(1) 238 (2.6.1996). ↩
- Leave for Civil Appeal 9646/04 Haski Alon Real Estate Initiation and Investments Ltd. v. Arie Michelson Real Estate Initiatives Ltd., IsrSC 59(3) 380 (2005). ↩
- See, e.g.: CA 8712/13 Adler v. Levanat (1.9.2015); CA 5025/13 Perot Metal Industries Ltd. v. Dadon (28.2.2016). ↩
- CA 8712/13 Adler v. Levanat (1.9.2015); CA 94/20 Luskin v. Givot Olam Oil Ltd. (18.8.2022). ↩
- CA 6290/17 Magnezi v. Levy (11.2.2018). ↩
- CC (Haifa District) 54976-01-16 Sar Fuel and Lubricant Stations Ltd. v. Shabtai (11.11.2018). ↩
- CC (Tel Aviv District) 16585-12-14 Raichman v. Olansky (7.2.2017); CC (Central District) 37385-01-18 Mansour v. Admiral Brands Netanya Ltd. (25.10.2021). ↩
- OM (Beer Sheva District) 58030-10-17 Lita Property Management and Financing Ltd. v. Kahalit Project Management Ltd. (15.2.2018); CC (Central District) 29438-02-21 Y.A.I. Simple Ltd. v. Caliber 5.56 Soldier Equipment Ltd. (1.7.2021). ↩
- CA 5804/19 S.B. Real Estate Management Ltd. v. Tinhav Construction and Development (1990) Ltd. (3.10.2021). ↩
- CC (Haifa District) 4806-06-22 Panda Commerce Applications Ltd. v. Lahav (23.2.2025). ↩
- CC (Tel Aviv District) 22538-09-22 Shach-Maor Management and Investments Ltd. v. Netzach Gazit (24.5.2026). ↩
- CA 1264/23 Tulik Rakia Entrepreneurship Ltd. v. Olirad Ltd. (22.10.2023). ↩
- CA 6290/17 Magnezi v. Levy (11.2.2018); CA 8776/23 Luskin v. Givot Olam Oil Ltd. (31.7.2025). ↩
- CA 8712/13 Adler v. Levanat (1.9.2015). ↩
This is general information and not legal advice. Each case depends on its circumstances and on the documents signed.